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I. What Is Sovereign Immunity?
The topic of sovereign immunity is too varied and too large to be fully
covered here. This broad topic has become even more volatile because of the
efforts of Sen. Slade Gorton (R.-Wash.) to alter or abrogate tribes' sovereign
immunity in various legislative proposals, as well as the efforts of other
members of Congress to counteract those proposals. Accordingly, this paper
endeavors to set out major principles on the sovereign immunity of the United
States and of Indian tribes and to apply those principles to current federal
legislation concernifig Indian tribes.
A. Historical Roots
Sovereign immunity is an expression of the lawmaking power of government
and reflects judgments concerning how public resources should be distributed.
As Alexander Hamilton famously observed: "[i]t is inherent in the nature of
sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.




exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the
government of every State in the Union."'
The inability of courts to enforce a judgment was a basis for the doctrine of
sovereign immunity noted in Chisholm v. Georgia! That case held a state liable
to suit by a citizen of another state or foreign country and created such a shock
that the Eleventh Amendment was at once proposed and adopted. Sovereign
immunity is also justified on the "logical and practical ground that there can be
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends."3 A further basis for the doctrine is avoidance of interference with
governmental functions and with the government's control of its
instrumentalities, funds and property.4
B. The Public Treasury or Domain
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is critically important where it truly
applies - to suits against the sovereign. But how does one determine if a suit
is against the sovereign? The simple answer is that a suit is against the
sovereign if"the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or
domain."'
In many cases the rule can be difficult to apply because the sovereign acts
through human individuals, and these agents are often the named defendants.
Sovereign immunity does not prevent suits challenging the acts of individuals
who violate federal or other applicable law. For this reason, a careful distinction
must be drawn between suits against officers of a government and suits against
the government itself. Although sovereign immunity provides limited protection
of the public treasury or domain, it does not generally protect the officers of the
sovereign.
Like states, tribes cannot clothe their officers with immunity to protect them
from the supreme law of the land. The landmark case of Ex parte Young,'
which established that states cannot authorize officials to enforce a tax that
violates the Constitution or laws of the United States, was recognized as
applying to Indian tribal officials in Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Department
of Game,7 and has been expressly cited in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,8 as
well as elsewhere.
1. TiE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 130 (Henry S. Commager ed., 1949).
2. 2 U.S. 419, 478 (1793).
3. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (Holmes, J.).
4. See generally Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine,
59 HARV. L. REv. 1060 (1946).
5. Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947) (holding that suit to compel U.S. Maritime
Commission to return pledged stock was not a suit against the sovereign).
6. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
7. 433 U.S. 165, 171-73 (1977).
8. 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978).
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Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe,9 stated: "[S]overeign
immunity does not extend to officials acting pursuant to an allegedly
unconstitutional statute .... [Tribal sovereign immunity does not bar a suit for
prospective relief against tribal officers allegedly acting in violation of federal
law.
o10
Despite this broad language, simply claiming that a tribal official's authority
is unconstitutional does not answer the sovereign immunity question. Instead a
court will look to the essential nature and effect of the relief sought to determine
whether the tribe "is the real, substantial party in interest."" Applying this rule,
the Supreme Court instructed that:
The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if "the
judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or
domain, or interfere with the public administration," Land v.
Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947), or if the effect of the judgment
would be "to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel
it to act." Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., [337 U.S. 682,]
704 [(1949)] .... ,
In United States v. Lee," an action of ejectment was brought by Lee and
others to recover land claimed by the United States. The suit was brought
against officers of the United States occupying and in charge of the land. The
Court said that "the doctrine, if not absolutely limited to cases in which the
United States are made defendants by name, is not permitted to interfere with
the judicial enforcement of the established rights of plaintiffs when the United
States is not a defendant or a necessary party to the suit."'4 The dissent,
however, noted:
The sovereign cannot hold property except by agents. To maintain
an action for the recovery of possession of property held by the
sovereign through its agents, not claiming any title or right in
themselves, but only as the representatives of the sovereign and in
its behalf, is to maintain an action to recover possession of the
ppzoperty against the sovereign; and to invade such possession of the
agents, by execution or other judicial process, is to invade the
possession of the sovereign, and to disregard the fundamental
maxim that the sovereign cannot be sued. 5
9. 924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1212 (1992).
10. id. at 901.
11. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
12. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963).
13. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
14. I. at 207-08.




The dissent is a more accurate statement of sovereign immunity; the doctrine
usually protects property of the sovereign that is occupied by the sovereign's
authorized agents.
United States v. Lee was narrowed in subsequent cases. Larson v. Domestic
& Foreign Commerce Corp.6 involved the sale of Army surplus coal. The
purchaser sued in federal court to restrain the War Assets Administrator from
transferring the coal to others, allegedly in breach of plaintiffs contract. The
Supreme Court directed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground of
sovereign immunity. The Court said plaintiff could proceed if it was asserting
that the defendant was seeking to enforce an unconstitutional enactment or
"acting in excess of his authority or under an authority not validly conferred."' 7
The Court stated:
IT]he action of an officer of the sovereign (be it holding, taking, or
otherwise legally affecting the plaintiffs property) can be regarded
as so "illegal" as to permit a suit for specific relief against the
officer as an officer as an individual only if it is not within the
officer's statutory powers or, if within those powers, only if the
powers, or their exercise in the particular case, are constitutionally
void."
In Larson, the War Assets Administrator had authority to sell the property;
plaintiffs simply wanted the government's coal.
C. Officer's Suits Regarding Land
In Malone v. Bowdoin,"9 plaintiffs sued for ejectment of a forest service
officer claiming they were the rightful owners of certain land. The United States
Supreme Court held that the suit was against the sovereign and tried to cut
through the confusion in prior case law:
While it is possible to differentiate many of [the cases following
United States v. Lee] upon their individualized facts, it is fair to say
that to reconcile completely all the decisions of the Court in this
field prior to 1949 would be a Procrustean task.
The Court's 1949 Larson decision makes it unnecessary,
however, to undertake that task here. For in Larson the Court,
aware that it was called upon to "resolve the conflict in doctrine"
(337 U.S., at 701), thoroughly reviewed the many prior decisions,
and made an informed and carefully considered choice between the
seemingly conflicting precedents ....
16. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
17. Id at 691.
18. Id. at 701-02.
19. 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
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While not expressly overruling United States v. Lee, supra, the
Court in Larson limited that decision .... [in] [p]ointing out that
at the time of the Lee decision there was no remedy by which the
plaintiff could have recovered compensation for the taking of his
land .... So construed, the Lee case has continuing validity only
"where there is a claim that the holding constitutes an
unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation."'"
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is now understood as being self-
executing and as furnishing plaintiff a right to compensation in a broad spectrum
of cases.2'
To limit other effects of federal sovereign immunity in cases involving
government land, in 1972 Congress passed the Quiet Title Act (QTA). The
QTA gives the United States' limited consent to be named as a party in actions
concerning disputed real property, except trust or restricted Indian land. In Block
v. North Dakota,' the Supreme Court rejected North Dakota's contention that
it could exceed the scope of the waiver in the Quiet Title Act "by the device of
an officer's suit."' The Court said:
If North Dakota's position were correct, all of the carefully
crafted provisions of the QTA deemed necessary for the protection
of the national public interest could be averted. "It would require
the suspension of disbelief to ascribe to Congress the design to
allow its careful and thorough remedial scheme to be circumvented
by artful pleading." Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 833 (1976).
If we were to allow claimants to try the Federal Government's
title to land under an officer's-suit theory, the Indian lands exception
to the QTA would be rendered nugatory. The United States could
also be dispossessed of the disputed property without being afforded
the option of paying damages ...
The principles described above regarding federal sovereign immunity are also
generally applicable to questions of state and tribal sovereign immunity. Thus,
when an individual tries to capture monies or property owned by a tribe in its
governmental capacity, sovereign immunity may protect the tribe unless there
is an exception, of which there are many.
20. Id at 646-48.
21. E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1994).
23. 461 U.S. 273 (1983).
24. Id. at 284.




Several cases illustrate the application of these principles to conflicts
involving tribal land. In Carlson v. Tulalip Tribes of Washington, an action
was brought to quiet title to certain waterfront lands within an Indian
reservation. Plaintiffs claimed that the tribe's asserted ownership of tidelands
clouded the title to their fee property. The United States refused to consent to
suit; the case was dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party.
Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapaho & Shoshone Tribess involved non-Indian
property within a reservation that for eighty years had been served by a small
access road across an allotment. The tribal council directed that the road be
blocked to shut down a new development. Plaintiffs were refused access to the
tribal court but obtained a temporary restraining order from the federal court.
A jury entered a damages judgment against the tribe. Shortly thereafter the
Supreme Court ruled in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez' that the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 did not expressly waive tribal sovereign immunity from suit
in federal court or create a substantive claim that could be asserted in federal
court. Nevertheless, the court of appeals reversed the lower court's dismissal of
the action on sovereign immunity grounds, holding "[t]here must exist a remedy
for parties in the position of plaintiffs to have the dispute resolved in an orderly
manner. To hold that they have access to no court is to hold that they have
constitutional rights but have no remedy."" (In Ramey Construction Co. v.
Apache Tribe?' the same court essentially limited Dry Creek to its facts. In
White v. Pueblo of San Juan2 the court distinguished Dry Creek because the
plaintiff in White had not sought a remedy in a tribal forum open to him. Dry
Creek has been read as applying to a narrow set of circumstances in other
federal circuits as well.)33
In Imperial Granite Co. v. Pala Band of Mission Indians plaintiff sued a
tribe, its officers, and all members of the tribe when the tribe halted access to
a road used for over 50 years that crossed a portion of the reservation." The
court of appeals upheld dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds.' Although
Imperial correctly noted that tribal officials are not necessarily immune from
26. 510 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1975).
27. See also Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 385 (1939).
28. 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1118 (1981).
29. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
30. Dry Creek 623 F.2d at 685.
31. 673 F.2d 315, 319 n.4 (10th Cir. 1982).
32. 728 F.2d 1307, 1312 (10th Cir. 1984).
33. Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1996); Miller v.
Coyhis, 877 F. Supp. 1262 (E.D. Wis. 1995); Barker v. Menominee Nation Casino, 897 F. Supp.
389 (E.D. Wis. 1995); R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir.
1983); Johnson v. Gila River Indian Community, 174 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1999).
34. 940 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1991) (Canby, J.).
35. Id. at 1270.
36. Id. at 1271.
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suit, the plaintiff there failed to show that tribal officials had acted outside of
their authority."
The complaint alleges no individual action by any of the tribal
officials named as defendants. As far as we're informed in
argument, the only action taken by those officials was to vote as
members of the Band's governing body against permitting Imperial
to use the road. Without more, it is difficult to view the suit against
the officials as anything other than a suit against the Band. The
votes individually have no legal effect; it is the official action of the
Band, following the votes, that caused Imperial's alleged injury."
Judge Canby went on to note cases holding that property rights in trust property
cannot be acquired by prescription nor are easements available by reason of
necessity.
Rowaond v. Hoopa Valley Tribe" involved a request that the tribal court
grant a temporary restraining order requiring the Tribe to provide access to
gravel which plaintiff was storing on tribal land. Plaintiff had been trespassing
on tribal land for a number of years, allegedly with verbal approval from a
Hoopa tribal employee. The tribal court denied the temporary restraining
order on the ground that plaintiff showed little likelihood of success on the
alleged right of access to the tribal land where plaintiffs gravel was stored. The
Hoopa court of appeals affirmed principles of tribal sovereign immunity but held
plaintiff entitled to a preliminary injunction allowing removal of the gravel
conditioned upon posting a bond for the value of the gravel removed.
While that case was pending, plaintiff brought a separate action in federal
district court, alleging that the tribal council exceeded its authority by exercising
jurisdiction over a nonmember and alleging federal jurisdiction on the basis of
National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians.4' The district
court rejected the tribe's argument that the council was acting solely in a
proprietary capacity, as owner of the land, and held that federal question
jurisdiction existed to determine whether the tribe had exceeded its authority
over a non-Indian under the circumstances, following exhaustion of tribal court
remedie. 4
These cases generally follow the rules described above for determining
whether a suit is truly against a sovereign. When the real party in interest in a
suit is an Indian tribe, because the judgment sought would reach the tribe's
37. I.:
38. Id. at 1271.
39. 21 Indian L Rep. 6087 (Hoopa Ct. App. 1992).
40. it at 1271-72.
41. 471 U.S. 845, 850-53 (1985).





property, sovereign immunity cannot be evaded by naming tribal officials as
defendants.43
Tribal governments act through officials and other individuals, just as all
other governments do. Sovereign immunity protects the public domain and
treasury from unauthorized suits; it neither authorizes nor protects persons who
violate the rights of another. Sovereign immunity does not permit wrongdoers
to continue their misconduct.
I. Federal and State Sovereigns Continue to Define Forums, Procedures,
and Limits to Suits Against Themselves
Senator Gorton has often claimed that Indian tribal governments are the only
governments in the United States that maintain and assert sovereign immunity.
This assertion is wrong. It is also said that tribal sovereign immunity is
coextensive with that of the United States. That assertion, too, is incorrect.
Sovereign immunity is best understood as the power of a government to define
the forum, procedure, and limits to be placed upon suits against itself. In other
words, sovereign immunity legislation and litigation mainly concerns the scope
of waivers of that immunity. As discussed below, there are many different
waivers of sovereign immunity at the federal, state, and tribal level. The scope
of these waivers varies greatly.
A. Except as Provided by Statute, the United States Retains Sovereign
Immunity
The United States has limited its sovereign immunity in several major steps,
but sovereign immunity remains a ubiquitous issue in litigation against the
federal government.
Congress created the Court of Claims in 1855 to hear claims against the
United States and report its findings to Congress. At the urging of President
Lincoln, Congress granted the court authority to enter final judgments against
the United States, subject to the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, in the Act
of March 3, 1863. In 1867, the Tucker Act, now codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1491, greatly expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to include
virtually all legal claims except tort, equitable, and admiralty claims against the
United States.
In United States v. Mitchell,45 the Supreme Court explained that if a claim
falls within the terms of the Tucker Act, the United States has presumptively
consented to suit. That rule does not mean, however, that all such claims are
43. Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1320 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S.
903 (1993) (holding that suit challenging act that divided land and funds among tribes
impermissibly sought tribal property protected by sovereign immunity).
44. Ch. 92, § 5, 12 Stat. 765, 766.
45. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
46. Id. at 215.
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compensable.47 For example, it would appear that many breach of trust claims
fail as do many other assertions that the Tucker Act applies to a case. Mitchell
sued over breaches of trust in connection with federal management of forest
resources on allotted lands of the Quinault Indian Reservation. Because the
particular statutes and regulations at issue could fairly be interpreted as
mandating compensation by the federal government for violations of its
fiduciary responsibilities in the management of Indian property, money damages
could be awarded.49
The federal waiver of immunity as to tort claims came much later, in 1946.
While the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)' is riddled with exceptions, it lays
down a general policy of responsibility for torts of governmental employees -
"under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred." 1 We discuss the scope of the FTCA below.
Apart from the Tucker Act and the FTCA, the United States could not
generally be sued in its own name until 1976; instead declaratory and injunctive
relief had to be sought by suing federal officials. In 1976 Congress amended the
Administrative Procedure Act. The amendment added a provision that, where
a federal court action seeks relief other than money damages and states a claim
that a federal agency or officer acted or failed to act in an official capacity or
under color of legal authority, such a claim "shall not be dismissed nor relief
therein be denied on the ground that [the suit] is against the United States or
that the United States is an indispensable party.' '
The purpose of the section 702 amendment was to remove the defenses of
indispensability and sovereign immunity as a bar to judicial review of federal
administrative action. Most importantly, section 702 provides that:
Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the
power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on
any other appropriate legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers
authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to
suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.
In other words, the limitations placed elsewhere on a waiver of sovereign
immunity in a particular case will still apply. The interplay of sovereign
47. I& at 216.
48. Id. at 210.
49. led at228.
50. Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
2671-2680 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
52. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).






immunity waivers is illustrated by FDIC v. Meyer." Meyer was fired as a
senior management employee shortly after the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) took over a failing savings and loan association.
Meyer claimed that his summary discharge deprived him of a property right to
continued employment without due process of law.' When Congress created
the FSLIC in 1934 it empowered the agency "[rlo sue and be sued, complain
and defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction."' The agency argued that
the FTCA limited the waiver of immunity contained in the agency's "sue-and-
be-sued clause," as the FTCA states in 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a). 8
Since the United States' liability under the FTCA is the same as the liability
that a private person would have under the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred, a constitutional tort claim such as Meyer's could not
contain such an allegation. Accordingly, the FTCA did not apply and did not
protect the agency.' Did the FDIC lose? No. Although Meyer had a right to
sue the FDIC, he sought to impose on the agency a form of tort liability - tort
liability arising under the Constitution - that generally does not apply to private
entities and which the court concluded cannot apply to acts of federal agencies
themselves.6' Thus although Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
AgentsO created a cause of action for damages against federal agents who
allegedly violate the federal Constitution, that cause of action does not exist
against an agency of the federal government.
B. State Sovereign Immunity Can Be Superseded by Other States but Not in
Federal Court
Unlike the sovereign immunity of the federal government, the scope of the
sovereign immunity of each of the States varies significantly, depending upon
each State's definition and waivers of its immunity in its constitution and
statutes. A discussion of state sovereign immunity is thus beyond the scope of
this paper. Accordingly, the following discussion highlights the effects of the
Eleventh Amendment and the Ex parte Young doctrine.
States have waived their sovereign immunity in widely varying degrees, as
illustrated by Nevada v. Hall.' In Hall, California residents sued in California
state court for damages resulting from injuries caused when a Nevada-owned
vehicle on official business collided with them on a California highway. The
trial court dismissed the case, but the California Supreme Court reversed and
55. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
56. Id. at 474.
57. Id. at 476.
58. 1l
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
60. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 474.
61. Id. at 485.
62. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
63. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
No. 2] 319
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
held Nevada amenable to suit in California courts. A jury awarded Hall
$1.2 million despite Nevada's claim that, under the full faith and credit clause
of the United States Constitution, a Nevada statute limiting any tort award
against Nevada to $25,000 should apply.
In Hall, the United States Supreme Court held that a state is not
constitutionally immune from suit in the courts of another state. The Court
discussed the history of the sovereign immunity doctrine and its early
development in American law. The debate about the suability of the states
initially focused on the scope of the judicial power of the United States
authorh.ed by Article II of the Constitution. The powers of federal courts to
entertain suits against a state were limited by the Eleventh Amendment. The
early cases concern questions of federal court jurisdiction and the extent to
which the states, by ratifying the Constitution and creating federal courts, had
author ed suits against themselves in those courts.
'These decisions do not answer the question whether the
Constitution places any limit on the exercise of one State's power
to authorize its courts to assert jurisdiction over another State. Nor
does anything in Art. IH . . . or in the Eleventh Amendment
limitation on that power, provide any basis, explicit or implicit, for
this Court to impose limits on the powers of California exercised in
this case.
Nevada argued that its statutory waiver of immunity consents to tort suits
only in its own courts; it contended that because the maximum allowable
recovery in Nevada court was $25,000, the suit in California should be subject
to the same limitation. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that
by entering into the Union, the states agreed to respect the sovereignty of each
other and limited their ability to treat other states as unfriendly nations. The
Court noted: "[t]he people of Nevada have consented to a system in which their
State is subject only to limited liability and tort. But the people of California,
who have had no voice in Nevada's decision, have adopted a different system.
Each of these decisions is equally entitled to our respect."'6
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe" explains the relationship between officer's
suits against a State and state sovereign immunity as embodied in the Eleventh
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.67 The Eleventh Amendment, which was
adopted in 1798, provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
64. at 421.
65. lId at 426.
66. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).




Subjects of any Foreign State."' Nevada v. Hall teaches us that the Eleventh
Amendment does not protect a State against suits in the courts of a sister state;
instead it limits the jurisdiction of federal courts only. Probably no state courts,
other than those of Idaho, would have had jurisdiction over the claims in Idaho
v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe. In that case the Coeur d'Alene Tribe and its members
flied suit in federal court against the State of Idaho, various state agencies and
numerous state officials in their individual capacities, alleging ownership in the
bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene and certain rivers within the original boundaries of
the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. The tribe sought a declaratory judgment
establishing exclusive use and occupancy and the right to quiet enjoyment of the
submerged land, together with declarative and injunctive relief concerning the
invalidity of Idaho laws purporting to regulate those lands.2
The district court dismissed, but the Ninth Circuit held that, under the
officer's suit doctrine of Ex parte Young," the tribe could proceed with its
claim that state officials were unlawfully interfering with tribal rights in the
lake!2 The United States Supreme Court reversed!,
Justice Kennedy wrote most of the opinion for the Court, holding that the
State's Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits by tribes, recently affirmed in
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, barred the case unless it fell within
the Ex parte Young doctrine, which permits declaratory and injunctive relief
against state officials in their individual capacities. Although a request for
prospective relief from an ongoing federal law violation is usually sufficient to
invoke the Young doctrine, the Court determined that the tribe's claims to the
lakebed were the functional equivalent of a quiet title action and implicated
special sovereignty interests.!S
An interesting aspect of the Supreme Court's ruling in Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe is the extensive discussion of Ex parte Young in a portion of
Justice Kennedy's opinion in which only Justice Rehnquist joined. That part of
Justice Kennedy's opinion advocates a case-by-case approach to the Ex parte
Young doctrine that would greatly restrict the courts' power to protect federal
rights. A concurrence by Justice O'Connor explains that Justice Kennedy's
theory - that federal jurisdiction was proper in early Ex parte Young cases
principally because no state forum was available to vindicate a plaintiffs claim
there - is actually unprecedented. Even Justice Kennedy's opinion concedes
that in recent cases the Exparte Young doctrine has been applied although there
was an effective remedy in state court. Justice O'Connor concludes:
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
69. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 264-65.
70. Id. at 265.
71. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
72. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 269.
73. d. at 281-88.
74. 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
75. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 281.
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The Young doctrine rests on the premise that a suit against a state
official to enjoin an ongoing violation of federal law is not a suit
against the State. Where a plaintiff seeks to divest the State of all
regulatory power over submerged lands - in effect, to invoke a
federal court's jurisdiction to quiet title to sovereign lands - it
simply cannot be said that the suit is not a suit against the State. I
would not narrow our Young doctrine, but I would not extend it to
reach this case'
The principles of Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe are fully applicable to tribal
sovereign immunity. However, Nevada v. Hall, discussed above, is not.
The 1998 decision in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing
Technologies, Inc.' provides a useful focus for current issues regarding the
scope of sovereign immunity waivers and the forums in which suits can be
brought. The Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, a federally recognized tribe,
established atribal entity called the Kiowa Industrial Development Commission.
In 1990, the commission agreed to purchase stock from Manufacturing
Technologies and the chairman of the tribe's business committee signed a
promissory note in the name of the tribe agreeing to pay $285,000 plus interest.
The note recites that it was signed on tribal trust land, but other evidence
suggested that it was signed in Oklahoma City, where the payments were to be
made. In a paragraph entitled "Waivers and Governing Law," the note provided:
"Nothing in this Note subjects or limits the sovereign rights of the Kiowa Tribe
of Oklahoma.""3
The tribe defaulted; Manufacturing Technologies sued in state court. The
Oklahoma court of appeals held that tribes are subject to suit in state court for
breaches of contract involving off-reservation commercial conduct. The United
States Supreme Court reversed:
As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only
where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its
immunity. See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold
Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986); Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); United States v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940)
(USF&G). To date, our cases have sustained tribal immunity from
suit without drawing a distinction based on where the tribal
activities occurred. In one case, a state court had asserted
jurisdiction over tribal fishing "both on and off its reservation."
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of Wash., 433 U.S.
165, 167 (1977). We held the Tribe's claim of immunity was "well
76. hlt at 296-97.
77. 118 S. Ct. 1700 (1998).




founded," though we did not discuss the relevance of where the
fishing had taken place. Id., at 168, 172. Nor have we yet drawn
a distinction between governmental and commercial activities of a
tribe. See, e.g., ibid. (recognizing tribal immunity for fishing,°which
may well be a commercial activity); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505 (1991)
(recognizing tribal immunity from suit over taxation of cigarette
sales); USF&G, supra (recognizing tribal immunity for coal-mining
lease). Though respondent asks us to confine immunity from suit
to transactions on reservations and to governmental activities, our
precedents have not drawn these distinctions.
Our cases allowing States to apply their substantive laws to tribal
activities are not to the contrary. We have recognized that a State
may have authority to tax or regulate tribal activities occurring
within the State but outside Indian country. See Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-149 (1973); see also Organized
Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962). To say
substantive state laws apply to off-reservation conduct, however, is
not to say that a tribe no longer enjoys immunity from suit. In
Potawatomi, for example, we reaffirmed that while Oklahoma may
tax cigarette sales by a Tribe's store to nonmembers, the Tribe
enjoys immunity from a suit to collect unpaid state taxes. 498 U.S.,
at 510. There is a difference between the right to demand
compliance with state laws and the means available to enforce
them. See id, at 514.
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals nonetheless believed federal
law did not mandate tribal immunity, resting its holding on the
decision in Hoover v. [Kiowa Tribe of] Oklahoma, 909 P.2d 59
(Okla. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1188 (1996). In Hoover, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that tribal immunity for off-
reservation commercial activity, like the decision not to exercise
jurisdiction over a sister State, is solely a matter of comity. 909
P.2d, at 62 (citing Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426 (1979)).
According to Hoover, because the State holds itself open to breach
of contract suits, it may allow its citizens to sue other sovereigns
acting within the State. We have often noted, however, that the
immunity possessed by Indian tribes is not coextensive with that of
the States. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501
U.S. 775 (1991). In Blatchford, we distinguished state sovereign
immunity from tribal sovereign immunity, as tribes were not at the
Constitutional Convention. They were thus not parties to the
"mutuality of... concession" that "makes the States' surrender of
immunity from suit by sister States plausible." Id., at 782; accord
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2033-2034
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(1997). So tribal immunity is a matter of federal law and is not
subject to diminution by the States. Three Affiliated Tribes, supra,
at 891; Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980)!9
In Kiowa, the Supreme Court repeatedly noted that tribal sovereign immunity
is subject to modification by Congress, as well as waiver by the tribes
themselves. Accordingly, we now turn to analysis of five current topics in tribal
sovereign immunity: contracts and waivers; collection of state taxes; tort claims;
the effect of the Indian Civil Rights Act; and federal environmental laws. Basic
principles of sovereign immunity in these topics are keenly illustrated by the
efforts oF Senator Gorton to alter or abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in his
bills in the 105th Congress, Senate Bill 1691 and Senate Bills 2298-2302, and
by Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell's (R.-Colo.) alternate proposal, Senate Bill
2097. Accordingly, the following sections examine the principles of sovereign
immunity underlying these five areas and how the proposed legislation will alter
them if enacted.
III. Contracts and Sovereign Immunity
A. The Rule of Unequivocal Waiver
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.' makes clear
that, to be effective, a waiver by contract of a tribe's sovereign immunity must
be clearly expressed. In Kiowa, the contractual language under "Waivers and
Governing Law" preserved the sovereign immunity of the Kiowa Tribe of
Oklahoma, although in somewhat ambiguous terms."' Plainly that language did
not meet the requirement that a waiver of immunity must be unequivocally
expressed; instead the Court's analysis focused on whether immunity existed at
all with respect to commercil conduct outside reservations.'
The general rule remains that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be
unequivocally expressed and cannot be implied.' "Suits against Indian tribes
are thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or
congressional abrogation. '
Whether and to what extent a contract clause constitutes a waiver of tribal
sovereign immunity turns on the terms of that clause." In Rosebud Sioux Tribe
79. RL at 1702-03.
80. 118 S. Ct. 1700 (1998).
81. See id. at 1705.
82. ht
83. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
84. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991).





v. Val-U Construction Co., the Eighth Circuit considered an arbitration clause
reading: "All questions of dispute under this Agreement shall be decided by
arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association."ln The court concluded that the "clause is
a clear expression that the Tribe has waived its immunity with respect to claims
under the contract. '
By contrast, in American Indian Agricultural Credit Consortium v. Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe," the Eighth Circuit construed a promissory note signed by
the tribal chairman that provided the plaintiff with several remedies upon
default, including the right to charge interest on the principal balance, "in
addition to such other and further rights and remedies provided by law." The
note also stated that rights and obligations under the note would be subject to
the law of the District of Columbia. Nowhere did the note expressly speak
to the tribe's consent to suit or to waiver of immunity from that suit. The court
said it would have no difficulty implying from the language in the tribal
resolution and the promissory note a waiver of sovereign immunity. However,
relying upon the rule that waivers of immunity must be expressed and cannot
be implied, the court rejected the claimed waiver.
Neither Kiowa nor American Indian Agricultural Credit Consortium should
be read as requiring that a contract use the magic words "sovereign immunity"
to accomplish an express waiver. Instead, the case law looks to whether a
contract specifies a court or other forum for resolution of disputes and states
what remedies, if any, are available to satisfy a judgment rendered by the
dispute resolution forum with jurisdiction t
B. Tailoring Contractual Limited Waivers to Fit Modem Tribal Needs
Because waivers of sovereign immunity are strictly construed, practitioners
are urged to prepare them with care. For example, in some situations a broad
immunity waiver might be appropriate, such as the following:
To the extent that the Tribe has immunity from suit to require enforcement
of this agreement, it hereby affirmatively waives all such immunity and consents
to resolution of disputes by arbitration in accordance with the [specific
arbitration rules]. The waiver of sovereign immunity includes, without
limitation, waiver of immunity as to jurisdiction and immunity from execution
of any judgment to compel or enforce any arbitration award rendered.
86. 50 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 819 (1995).
87. 1, at 562.
88. Id.
89. 780 F.2d 1374 (8th Cir. 1985).
90. Id. at 1376 n.3.
91. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of W. Hollywood, 361 F.2d 517,
521-22 (5th Cir. 1966).
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To the extent that the Tribe or its assets or properly have, or may hereafter
acquire, tny immunity from the jurisdiction of [specified] court or from any
legal process under the laws of [applicable jurisdiction], the Tribe hereby
irrevocably waives such immunity with respect to the obligations arising under
this contract. This provision shall not apply to any tribal lands nor to funds or
other property held by the United States in trust for the Tribe or its members.
A careful approach to preparing a waiver starts with the realization that a
waiver of tribal sovereign immunity is not an all-or-nothing proposition.
Although a broad waiver is what many non-Indian contractors seek, many
Indian tribes agree to include more limited waivers of sovereign immunity
within their contracts (rather than flatly refusing to waive immunity) to attract
investors and businesses to their reservations. The potential variety of
transactions in which tribes may participate requires careful legal analysis of the
elements of a waiver on a case-by-case basis. This list of elements is not
exhaustive, and waivers can and should be carefully tailored to the
circumstances. The limitations that are appropriate in one situation may be
entirely unworkable in another.
1. Limit Who May Bring Claim
A waiver of tribal sovereign immunity should limit who can bring a claim
to only the lender or contractor and should not extend to any other party,
including any successor or assign of the lender or contractor:
This waiver of immunity shall not extend to or be used for or to the benefit
of any other person or entity of any kind or description whatsoever, including
any successor or assign of lender.
2. Limit Types of Claims Allowed
A waiver of tribal sovereign immunity should also limit claims to
enforcement of the contract and any disputes arising under the contract. A
waiver in a contract should bar alternative theories of recovery, such as tort
claims. Although contract claims would primarily consist of claims for
monetary damages, they might include claims for injunctive or declaratory relief.
This waiver of immunity is strictly limited to enforcement of the provisions
of this Agreement and to any dispute that may arise under or in relation to this
Agreement or operations performed under this Agreement between the parties.
3. Limit Types of Relief
A waiver of tribal sovereign immunity should limit the type of relief that
may be claimed. As discussed in paragraph 2, above, claims can consist of
claims for monetary damages as well as claims for injunctive and declaratory
relief.
The Tribe's waiver of immunity from suit is specifically limited to an award




4. Limit Choice of Forum
A limited waiver can permit suit against the waiving tribe in any forum that
would otherwise have jurisdiction over the subject matter. By consenting to the
jurisdiction of the federal courts (where jurisdiction exists) many non-Indian
lenders and contractors may be put at ease that the tribal court is not the
exclusive forum for hearing their claims. Note, however, that federal jurisdiction
will not exist in many situations:
To the extent jurisdiction obtains, this limited waiver of immunity shall be
deemed a consent to the jurisdiction only of the Tribal Court and the United
States District Court for this District.
5. Limit Choice of Law
Generally, a waiver of sovereign immunity should also include a statement
specifying the choice of law to be applied by the court hearing the claim:
The law to be applied in any action against the Tribe shall be: firs the law
of the Tribe, including traditional tribal laws; second, federal law, including
federal statutory and common law; and third, in the absence of appropriate
tribal or federal law, the law of the State of
6. Limit Total Judgment Amount and Source from Which Judgment May
Be Satisfied
A fundamental way in which a waiver can be limited is to total judgment
amount. Generally, a waiver of immunity should restrict the type of relief to the
amount owed under the contract plus any interest allowed by the terms of the
contract. The limitation amount may be based on a total contract amount or on
some other figure.
An additional limitation is the source from which any judgment may be
satisfied. In other words, it is imperative that the tribe identify project funds, a
stream of revenue, an insurance policy, 'or other specific property or asset to be
used to satisfy a judgement in order to preclude the levy of any judgment, lien,
or attachment upon other property or assets of the tribe.
Z Limit Types of Damages
If a limited waiver of sovereign immunity allows for monetary damages, the
types of monetary damages can also be limited. For example, a limited waiver
may permit recovery of only foreseeable damages, not lost profits, or only back
pay and benefits, not front pay and emotional damages. Since many standard
contracts include a provision allowing the recovery of attorneys' fees to a
successful litigant under the contract, a limited waiver of tribal sovereign
immunity should restrict such a recovery. Postjudgment interest should also be
specifically prohibited:
This waiver of immunity specifically does not allow for recovery of attorneys
fees or postjudgment interest and does not extend to actions for declaratory
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judgment or injunctive relief. Except as expressly provided herein, nothing in
this limited waiver of immunity shall be construed as a waiver or consent to the
levy of any judgment, lien, or attachment upon any property or interest in
property of the Tribe. A judgment against the Tribes pursuant to this limited
waiver of immunity may be satisfied only from the [project
funds, stream of revenue, insurance policy, or other specific property or asset
of the Tribe].
8. Limit Duration of the Waiver
A limited waiver of tribal sovereign immunity should be limited in duration.
Generally, the relevant period is determined by the specific circumstances
involved with the contract (e.g., service contract versus construction contract):
Notwithstanding any applicable statute of limitations or other law, this
limited waiver shall be enforceable only for [one year, six months, etc.]
following the termination of this Agreement, and only as to claims arising
during the effective period of this Agreement.
C. Senator Gorton's Proposals Concerning Sovereign Immunity in Contracts
in Senate Bill 2299
On February 27, 1998, Senator Gorton introduced Senate Bill 1691, the so-
called American Indian Equal Justice Act. Senator Gorton withdrew the bill
from fuither consideration on May 20, 1998, just days before issuance of the
Kiowa opinion. Senate Bill 1691 addressed the issue of tribal sovereign
immuniv in contracts in two ways: First, section 4(a) proposed to amend the
Tucker Act to give district courts: "[J]urisdiction of any civil action or claim
against an Indian tribe for liquidated or unliquidated damages for cases not
sounding in tort that involve any contract made by the governing body of the
Indian tribe or on behalf of an Indian tribe."'
Second, Senate Bill 1691 proposed to abolish sovereign immunity in
contracts in suits in state court pursuant to section 6(a), which granted federal
consent to civil causes of action against a tribe in a court of general jurisdiction
of a state for claims "that involve any contract made by the governing body of
an Indian tribe or on behalf of an Indian tribe."
Senator Gorton's additional proposal to eliminate sovereign immunity in tribal
contracts is found in Senate Bill 2299, introduced July 14, 1998. The key part
of this bill is found in section 4, which would add to 28 U.S.C. § 1362 the
following subsections:
(b)(1) The district courts shall have jurisdiction of any civil
action or claim against an Indian tribe (including a tribal
organization, as that term is defined in section 4(1) of the Indian
Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act (25 U.S.C.




section 450b(1)) for liquidated or unliquidated damages for cases
not sounding in tort that involve any contract made by the
governing body of the Indian tribe or on behalf of the Indian tribe.
(2) to the extent necessary to enforce this subsection, the tribal
immunity (as that term is defined in section 3 of the American
Indian Contract Enforcement Act) of the Indian tribe involved is
waived."
Some tribes by resolution or ordinance have declared that they will not assert
sovereign immunity with respect to claims arising from written contracts and
which are brought in tribal court. Other tribes as a matter of policy do not assert
immunity in tribal court in such circumstances. More generally, an express
written partial waiver of a tribe's or tribal entity's sovereign immunity is
common in contracts. Sovereign immunity is often waived by an arbitration
clause.' Any contractor doing business with a sovereign who does not
determine that remedies for a breach are available in a particular court, or
through arbitration, should seek better legal advice.
Is there a need for federal district court jurisdiction for contract claims
against Indian tribes? Senator Gorton's bill would address the concern of some
tribes who oppose enforcement of contracts in state court but cannot
demonstrate a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction in the event of dispute,
such as a refusal to arbitrate. For example, to permit a federal court to confirm
an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act, 5 a party must
demonstrate an independent ground for federal subject matter jurisdiction.6
Because tribes are not citizens of any state for the purposes of federal diversity
jurisdiction and because a contract dispute may not present a case arising under
federal law, federal jurisdiction is often unavailable.
Senate Bill 2299 would change substantive law far more drastically than
authorizing a federal forum for contract disputes. Senate Bill 2299 waives tribal
immunity from jurisdiction, judicial review, and "remedies," and thus eliminates
the negotiations that currently occur between tribes and contractors concerning
procedures applicable to disputes and assets available to satisfy claims. By
contrast, when Congress authorized incorporation of tribal entities under the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, it authorized appropriate partial waivers of
the immunity of the tribal corporations as set forth in corporate charters. As
illustrated in the case law construing 25 U.S.C. § 477, contractual waivers of
immunity are ordinarily limited to particular assets."
93. S. 2299, 105th Cong., § 4 (1998).
94. See generally Tamiami Partners Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 63 F.3d 1030 (1 lth
Cir. 1995).
95. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994).
96. See General Atomic Co. v. United Nuclear Corp., 655 F.2d 968, 969 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982); GNS, Inc. v. Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, 866 F. Supp.
1185, 1189 (N.D. Iowa 1994).
97. See also 25 C.F.R. § 162.12 (1999) (authorizing encumbrance of leasehold interests);
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IV. Sovereign Immunity and Collection of State Taxes
A. Is Enforcement of State Taxes in Indian Country a Sovereign Immunity Issue?
Present law permits States to enforce the collection of lawful state taxes on
nonmembers who purchase within Indian country, but the States have been
reluctant to use available remedies, preferring instead to negotiate tax collection
agreements.
In Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes and subsequent cases,
the Uniled States Supreme Court has held that tribes are required to collect sales
taxes on nonmember purchases of cigarettes. In Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, and in Department
of Taxation & Finance of New York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., w the Supreme
Court pointed out that States have several alternatives for enforcing the
requirement of tribal assistance in collecting lawful state taxes, including
precollecting taxes from wholesalers and the right to sue individual agents or
officers of the tribe for damages caused by their neglect or refusal to carry out
that duty.
. In Bogan v. Scott-Harris,' the Supreme Court reaffirmed that local
legislators may be held liable for violating a court order to levy a tax sufficient
to pay a judgment. The Court noted that the order had created a "ministerial
duty" on the part of the legislators and stated, "[tihe rule is well settled that
where the law requires absolutely a ministerial act to be done by a public
officer, and he neglects or refuses to do such act, he may be compelled to
respond in damages to the extent of the injury arising from his conduct."'l"
After Bogan, it is clear that tribal immunity need not be modified simply to help
States enforce the requirements (established by other Supreme Court cases) that
tribal agents and officials create records and collect certain taxes lawfully
imposed on nonmembers purchasing imported goods on Indian reservations.
B. Senator Gorton's Approach to Collection of State Taxes on Nonmembers
in Senate Bill 1691
Section 3 of Senate Bill 1691 proposed to create federal district court
jurisdiction to hear cases brought by States to compel a tribe, tribal corporation,
or member of a tribe to collect state sale, use and excise taxes that are "imposed
by the State on nonmembers of the Indian tribe as a consequence of the
Red Mountain Mach. Co. v. Grace Inv. Co., 29 F.3d 1408 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1044
(1994).
98. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
99. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
100. 512 U.S. 61 (1994).
101. 118 S. Ct. 966 (1998).
102. Id. (quoting Amy v. Supervisors, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 136, 138 (1870)).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol24/iss2/3
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
purchase of goods or services by the nonmember." This language would change
the substantive law concerning what state taxes may be enforced within Indian
country. Is this a sovereign immunity issue?
A "member of an Indian tribe" within the meaning of Senate Bill 1691 is not
now protected by tribal sovereign immunity because of the Ex parte Young
doctrine, discussed above. Also individual Indians in many states are subject to
state court jurisdiction under Public Law 280, noted below. Whether a tribal
corporation can be sued varies from case to case depending upon the law
creating the corporation and the corporate charter. For example, tribal entities
incorporated under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, generally have partial
waivers of the immunity of the tribal corporations set forth in the corporate
charter.
Senate Bill 1691 further departs from the tribal sovereign immunity issue by
changing substantive law concerning taxation within Indian country. Section 3
would create a right of enforcement of "any excise, use, or sales tax imposed
by the State on nonmembers of the Indian tribe." This provision would change
federal law by authorizing state taxation of all nonmember purchases of goods
or services in Indian country regardless of whether that tax is expressly or
impliedly preempted by other federal laws. By looking only to whether the tax
is "imposed by the State," Senate Bill 1691 would override the preemptive
effect of federal laws concerning Indian timber, gaming, and other areas where
state taxation of non-Indian purchases or services within Indian country is
precluded. Several cases illustrate the sweeping effect of section 3.
In Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax Commission,"n the Supreme
Court held that federal statutes and treaties asserting sweeping and dominant
control over federal Indian traders precluded the State's imposition of a gross
receipts tax on nonmember business trading within the Navajo Reservation. In
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Brackerln Arizona imposed on a non-Indian
enterprise organized to conduct tribal logging operations a gross receipts tax, a
motor carrier license tax, and a fuel tax. The Supreme Court held that the
harvest and sale of Indian timber was the subject of a comprehensive federal
regulatory scheme that left no room for state taxation of the non-Indian
purchases and activities within Indian country. In New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe," the Supreme Court rejected licensing fees sought to be
imposed by the state on nonmembers who hunt and fish on that reservation. The
Court noted that:
Concurrent jurisdiction would empower New Mexico wholly to
supplant tribal regulations. The State would be able to dictate the
terms on which nonmembers are permitted to utilize the
103. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
104. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
105. 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
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reservation's resources. The Tribe would thus exercise its authority
over the reservation only at the sufferance of the State. The tribal
authority to regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers, which has
been repeatedly confirmed by federal treaties and laws ... would
have a rather hollow ring if tribal authority amounted to no more
than this."n
In sum, Senate Bill 1691 offered the States a tool for tax collection without
any showing that the tools already available will not work. Section 3 also
changes substantive law to lift the preemptive effect of federal statutes and
regulations that exempt from taxation the purchases of goods or services by
nonmembers of a tribe under certain circumstances, such as where value
generated on the reservation is intended to be preserved to accomplish federal
goals.
107
C. Senator Gorton's Approach to Sovereign Immunity and State Tax
Collection in Senate Bill 2300
Section 3 of Senate Bill 1691 was reincarnated with some changes in Senator
Gorton's Senate Bill 2300, introduced July 14, 1998, as the State Excise, Sales
and Transaction Tax Enforcement Act of 1998. The bill provides:
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds that -
(1) a long line of decisions of the United States Supreme Court
has established that States have the right to collect lawfully imposed
nondiscriminatory State excise, sales, and transaction taxes on the
purchase of a good or service from an Indian tribe (including a
tribal government or tribal corporation) by a person who is not a
member of that Indian tribe;
(2) the collection of the taxes referred to in paragraph (1) has
been impeded by the assertion of tribal immunity by Indian tribes
(including tribal governments and corporations) and members of an
Indian tribe as a defense in an action in a Federal court that is
necessary to enforce the collection of the State taxes that apply to
the sales referred to in paragraph (1); and (3) the failure of an
Indian tribe (including a tribal government or tribal corporation) or
a member of an Indian tribe to act as an agent of a State to collect
a State tax referred to in paragraph (1) -
106. Id at 338.
107. See Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1055 (1990) (holding that State could not impose timber yield tax against non-Indian companies




(A) unlawfully deprives that State of essential tax revenues
needed for infrastructure improvement and ensuring the health and
welfare of all of the citizens of that State; and
(B) creates a disadvantage for law-abiding businesses that are not
associated with the Indian tribe and that fulfill their obligation to act
as an agent of the State, and, as a result of that disadvantage, some
of those businesses may be forced out of business.
SEC. 3. COLLECTION OF STATE TAXES.
Section 1362 of title 28, United States Code, is amended -
(1) by inserting "(a) In General. -" before "The district courts";
(2) by inserting "(referred to in this section as an 'Indian tribe')"
after "Interior"; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
"(b) Collection of Qualified State Taxes by Indian Tribes. -
"(1) Definitions. - In this subsection:
"(A) Good or service. - The term 'good or service' includes any
tobacco product or motor fuel (within the meaning of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986).
"(B) Qualified state tax. -
"(i) In general. - The term 'qualified State tax' means any
lawfully imposed, nondiscriminatory excise, sales, or transaction tax
imposed by a State on a purchase of a good or service from a tribal
retail enterprise by a person who is not a member of that Indian
tribe.
"(ii) Exceptions. - The term does not include any State tax
"(I) imposed on the sale of a good or service by a tribal retail
enterprise to a person who is not a member of an Indian tribe with
respect to which, as of the date of enactment of the State Excise,
Sales, and Transaction Tax Enforcement Act of 1998, the tribal
retail enterprise is exempted under the law of that State from
collecting and remitting because the Indian tribe associated with that
tribal retail enterprise imposes and collects an equivalent tax on
such sale in an amount equal to the tax that would otherwise be
imposed by the State;
"(I) imposed on the sales of a tribal retail enterprise if, as of the
date of enactment of the State Excise, Sales, and Transaction Tax
Enforcement Act of 1998, the State has waived the applicability of
that tax to the purchase of a good or service from that tribal retail
enterprise by a person who is not a member of the Indian tribe of
the owner or operator of that tribal retail enterprise;
"(IMI that is the subject, as of the date of enactment of the State
Excise, Sales, and Transaction Tax Enforcement Act of 1998, of an
agreement between a tribal retail enterprise and a State that exempts
that tribal retail enterprise from collecting and remitting that tax; or
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"(IV) with respect to which the incidence of the tax falls on an
Indian tribe (including a tribal government or tribal corporation) or
member of an Indian tribe.
"(C) Tribal immunity. - The term 'tribal immunity' means the
immunity of an Indian tribe (including a tribal government or tribal
corporation) from jurisdiction of the Federal courts, judicial review
of an action of that Indian tribe, and other remedies.
"(D) Tribal retail enterprise. - The term 'tribal retail enterprise'
includes any entity that -
"(i) is owned or operated by an Indian tribe (including a tribal
government or tribal corporation) or member of an Indian tribe; and
"(ii) engages in the business of the wholesale or retail sales of
a good or service.
"(2) Collection of qualified State taxes. - Subject to paragraph
(3), the owner or operator of a tribal retail enterprise shall collect
and remit such qualified State taxes as the owner or operator of the
tribal retail enterprise is required to collect and remit.
"(3) Conflict resolution. -
"(A) Declaratory judgments. - A State may bring an action for
a declaratory judgment under section 2201 of this title in a district
court of appropriate jurisdiction concerning the applicability or
lawfulness of a qualified State tax referred to in paragraph (2).
"(B) Actions. - A State may bring an action against a tribal
retail enterprise, or the Indian tribe (including a tribal government
or tribal corporation) or member of an Indian tribe that owns or
operates the tribal retail enterprise in a district court of appropriate
jurisdiction to enforce the collection or remittance of a qualified
State tax under paragraph (2).
"(C) Waiver of tribal immunity. - In an action referred to in
subparagraph (A) or (B), to the extent necessary to obtain a
judgment in that action, the tribal immunity of the Indian tribe
(including a tribal government or tribal corporation) or member of
the Indian tribe is waived."'t
As can be seen, Senate Bill 2300 does respond to criticism, leveled at Senate
Bill 1691 during committee hearings, that Senator Gorton's earlier bill overrode
the efforts of a number of tribes and States to negotiate tax collection and
revenue sharing agreements. Senate Bill 2300 also acknowledges the fact that
some States have chosen not to impose a tax on reservation transactions where
the tribe collects an equivalent tax on such sales.
A key ambiguity in Senate Bill 2300 is found in the definition of "good or
service" that "includes any tobacco product or motor fuel." What else does it




"include?" To the extent that Senate Bill 2300 could be construed to authorize
state tax collection on value generated on reservations, and in particular, sales
of tribal natural resources, Senate Bill 2300 would drastically alter federal law
that preempts state taxation in order to achieve the federal goal of tribal self-
sufficiency and economic self-determination.
D. Senator Campbell's Approach to State Tax Collection Issues in Senate Bill
2097
On May 20, 1998, Senator Campbell, Chairman of the Senate Indian Affairs
Committee, introduced Senate Bill 2097, the Indian Tribal Conflict Resolution,
Tort Claims, and Risk Management Act of 1998. Senate Bill 2097's approach
to state tax collection issues is straightforward: intergovernmental agreements
(compacts). Section 101 would authorize intergovernmental compacts regarding
collection and payment of retail taxes. Section 102 proposes intergovernmental
negotiations and establishes procedures. Section 103 would create an
intergovernmental alternative dispute resolution panel. Section 104 would allow
judicial enforcement and provides: "Each compact or agreement entered into
under this title shall specify that the partner consent to litigation to enforce the
agreement, and to the extent necessary to enforce the agreement, each party
waives any defense of sovereign immunity."'" Senate Bill 2097 would also
create a joint tribal-federal-state commission on intergovernmental affairs and
provide funding for administration of tax collection compacts. The tort claims
and risk management provisions of Senate Bill 2097 are discussed in
section V.E. below.
V. Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Tort Claims
A. Because of the Indian Self-Determination Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act
Applies to Many Tort Claims Against Tribes
Most, if not all, activities of tribal governments are the subject of compacts
and contracts under the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance
Act of 1975 (ISDA)."' The ISDA enables tribes to carry out governmental
functions that would otherwise be performed by the federal government and
allows reallocation of limited federal funds, supplemented by tribal funds, to
carry out governmental priorities selected by the tribe."'
Under present law, while carrying out an ISDA-authorized activity, tribal
employees are:
109. S. 2097, 105th Cong. § 104(a)(2) (1998).
110. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25
U.S.C.).
11. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 450f, 458cc (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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[l]eemed employees of the Bureau or Service while acting within
the scope of their employment ... [and] claims . .. shall be
deemed to be... against the United States and will be defended by
the Attorney General and be afforded the full protection and
coverage of the Federal Tort Claims Act."'
The regulations for implementing coverage under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) illustrate its applicability to Indian tribes: "Does FTCA cover
employees of the contractor who are paid by the contractor from funds other
than those provided through the self-determination contract? Yes, as long as the
services out of which the claim arose were performed in carrying out the self-
determination contract.""3 Under the 1994 amendments to Pub. L. 93-638,
Title I :[SDA contracts have many of the features of Title IV Self-Governance
compacts. In both instances tribes may redirect contract funds to better meet
tribal needs. In the case of self-governance compacts, section 2 of the Annual
Funding Agreement (AFA) typically specifies the programs, activities, functions
and services to be provided under the self-governance compact. A tribe applies
funds from the AFA and funds available from other sources to carry out these
activities. All activities performed in carrying out the functions specified in the
AFA are protected by the FTCA just as if they were being carried out by a
federal employee. As the proposed rules to implement the Tribal Self-
Governance Act state, at section 1000.250: "Is the F1TCA the exclusive remedy
for a tort claim arising out of the performance of a self-governance AFA?
Yes."
M
Congress has moved carefully and incrementally to insure liability coverage
for activities carried out by Indian tribes. When the ISDA was initially enacted
in 1975, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to require any tribe
to obtain liability insurance as a prerequisite to exercising the authorities of the
Act. Congress also prohibited insurance carriers from using tribal sovereign
immunity to defeat claims within the coverage of the policy. In 1990, Congress
required the Secretary of the Interior to obtain or provide liability insurance or
equivalent coverage on the most cost-effective basis for tribes carrying out
contracts and agreements."' Ultimately, in 1993, the language quoted above
was made generally applicable. This makes it clear that the FTCA applies to
Indian -tribes carrying out functions under the ISDA.
B. Like the FTCA, State Tort Claims Acts Continue to Protect State
Governments from Tort Claims Arising from Normal Governmental
Functions and Exercises of Discretion
112. Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L No. 101-512, Title 11, § 314, 104 Stat. 1915, 1959-60,
amended by Act of Nov. 11, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-138, Title III, § 308, 107 Stat. 1379, 1416.
113. 25 C.F.R. § 900.197 (1998).
114. 63 Fed. Reg. 7201, 7245 (Feb. 12 1998).




Like the FTCA, most state tort claims acts expressly immunize the State
from claims arising from normal governmental functions and exercises of
discretion. A few cases from the California courts of appeals illustrate this. In
Cairns v. County of Los Angeles,"6 plaintiffs' homes were damaged by a fire.
California retains a statutory governmental immunity for failure to provide fire
protection service."7 But plaintiffs contended that a dangerous condition on
public property was actually the cause of their damages, specifically the closure
of a road which made it impossible for fire fighters to respond to the
emergency."" The court noted that under the California Tort Claims Act, a
public entity is not liable for an injury unless that act specifically allows for that
liability. In addition, the liability of a public entity is subject to immunities
provided by statute."9 In Cairns, the county's failure to repair a damaged road
simply amounted to a failure to provide fire protection, a situation in which the
county is statutorily protected by immunity.'"m
Like counties, of course, Indian tribes provide fire protection within the limit
of government resources and require immunity in connection with those
activities.
In Weaver v. State of California,' a passenger in a car pursued by police
officers sought damages for his injuries in the accident. The court rejected the
claim, noting that California Vehicle Code section 17004.7 "was enacted in
1987 to provide immunity to governmental entities which previously had
enjoyed only limited immunity while their police officer employees were
entirely immune. ' ""
Indian tribes, like states, provide police protection and, in the normal
operation of police activities, injuries occur. As discussed below, some injuries
are now covered by the FTCA.m However, the remedies available to injured
parties do not and should not permit them to reach the public treasury or
domain of tribal governments.
C. Senator Gorton's Approach to Tribal Tort Liability in Senate Bill 1691: A
Claims Procedure Without Defenses
Senate Bill 1691 would strip tribes of their present coverage under the
FTCA. Senate Bill 1691 would also transfer from the federal government to
tribes the cost of compensating persons entitled to damages under the FTCA.
There is no obvious policy justification for transferring to tribes the burden of
defending against claims and paying for injuries that result from carrying out
116. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 460 (1997).
117. CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 850, 850.2, 850.4 (West 1999).
118. Cairns, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 461-62.
119. Md. at 462.
120. /a1 at 463.
121. 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571 (1998).
122. lit at 280 (quoting Colvin v. City of Gardena, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1277 (1992)).
123. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994).
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functions that would otherwise be performed by the federal government. Yet
that is the effect of these sections of Senate Bill 1691.
Sections 4 and 5 of Senator Gorton's Senate Bill 1691 supposedly parallel the
Tucker Act and the FTCA. In fact, sections 4 and 5 would essentially eliminate
the role of tribal courts under existing law and, unlike those acts, would deny
Indian governments the statutory protection for discretionary functions and the
procedural protections of an administrative claims process that currently exist
under the FTCA.
Sections 4 and 5 give federal district courts original jurisdiction in civil
actions arising under federal law. Under current law, Indian tribal courts
exercise jurisdiction over such claims and, if a tribal court exceeds its authority,
jurisdiction exists in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Thus, these
provisions of Senate Bill 1691 would reverse the Supreme Court's rulings in
National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,' and
subsequent cases, which require that such claims first be presented in Indian
tribal courts:
Our cases have often recognized that Congress is committed to a
policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination.
That policy favors a rule that will provide the forum whose
jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the
factual and legal bases for the challenge. Moreover the orderly
administration of justice in the federal court will be served by
allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal Court before
either the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is
addressed."z
In FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes," and in Mustang Production Co. v.
Harrison," federal courts of appeals have ruled that, while federal courts may
be guided by a tribal court's expertise they have no obligation to defer to a tribal
court's decision, and thus legal questions are reviewed de novo. These cases
address whether a tribe had authority over a non-Indian employer on reservation
and whether federal laws limited tribal authority to tax certain lands. Because
tribal courts have the most expertise concerning controversies arising on their
reservations, there is no good policy reason to change the requirement that
parties in civil actions exhaust available tribal court remedies. However,
elimination of the exhaustion requirement for claims against tribes or tribal
members appears to be a principal intent and effect of these provisions of
Senate Bill 1691.
124. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
125. Id. at 856 (footnotes omitted).
126. 905 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990).




Senate Bill 1691's failure to recognize normal governmental immunities from
tort claims could produce disastrous effects. Sections 4 and 5 of Senate Bill
1691 would make a tribal government liable for injury or loss of property or
death under circumstances in which "a private individual or corporation" would
be liable. By contrast, the Federal Tort Claims Act preserves the "judicial or
legislative immunity" defense to the United States" and has a series of
itemized exceptions and defenses of the United States in 28 U.S.C. § 2680.
Those defenses are currently available to most tribal employees because of the
present applicability of the FTCA.
Whether a FTCA claim against the federal government is barred by the
discretionary function exception is determined by tests announced in Berkovitz
v. United States." In general, administrative judgments involving the
allocation and deployment of limited governmental resources are immunized
from suit by the discretionary function exemption."u Such administrative
decisions are made by Indian tribal governments just like any other government.
Section 5 of Senate Bill 1691 will also treat tribes less fairly than the federal
government or the States. For example, the bill does not propose anything
comparable to the FTCA procedure that requires submission of a claim to the
federal agency involved and compliance with strict time deadlines in order for
persons to recover.' Also, unlike the FTCA, the bill would not give tribes the
benefit of the exclusiveness of remedy provisions that protect the United States
and its employees." In addition, the bill lacks the FTCA limitation on
attorney fees, which Congress imposed to discourage the filing of non-
meritorious claims."
D. Senator Gorton's Proposal Concerning Sovereign Immunity from Tort
Claims in Senate Bill 2302
Senator Gorton reincarnated the tort provisions of Senate Bill 1691 in Senate
Bill 2302, which he introduced July 14, 1998, the so-called American Indian
Tort Liability Insurance Act. This bill provides:
SEC. 2. AMERICAN INDIAN TORT LIABILITY
INSURANCE.
(a) Findings. - Congress finds that -
128. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994) ("United States shall be entitled to assert any defense based
upon judicial or legislative immunity which otherwise would have been available to the employee
of the United States whose act or omission gave rise to the claim").
129. 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).
130. See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); General Dynamics Corp. v.
United States, 139 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 1998); Kiehn v. United States, 984 F.2d 1100, 1107 (10th
Cir. 1993).
131. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1994) (disposition by federal agency is a prerequisite to claim).
132. See id. § 2679.
133. See id § 2678.
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(1) Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies,
InW., 523 U.S. - (1998), recognized the increasing interaction
between tribal governments, tribal corporations, or individual
members of Indian tribes with individuals who are not members of
an Indian tribe, on and off Indian reservations (including property
held in trust for Indian tribes) in the areas of economic development
and commerce;
(2) the interaction referred to in paragraph (1) may lead to
disputes that could include claims by individuals against tribal
governments or tribal organizations as a result of injury in tort;
(3) as Justice Kennedy stated in his opinion in Kiowa Tribe of
Okloaoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., the doctrine of
tribal immunity asserted by the governing bodies of Indian tribes to
shield the Indian tribes from court actions that are necessary to
recover for the liability of the governing bodies or tribal
organizations of Indian tribes, can "harm those who are unaware
that they are dealing with a tribe, who do not know of tribal
immunity, or who have no choice in the matter, as in the case of
tort victims"; and
(4) in order to provide protection for individuals interacting with
tribal governments or organizations -
(A) Indian tribes should maintain tort liability insurance; and
(B) tribal immunity should not be used as a basis for the denial
of a claim under that tort liability insurance.
(b) Definition. - In this section:
(1) Indian tribe. - The term 'Indian tribe" has the meaning
given that term in sections 4(e) of the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450b(e)).
(2) Secretary. - The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of
the Interior.
(3) Tribal immunity. - The term "tribal immunity" means the
immunity of an Indian tribe from -
(A) jurisdiction of the courts; and
(B) judicial review of an action of that Indian tribe and other
remedies.
(4) Tribal organization. - The term "tribal organization" has the
meaning given that term in sections 4(1) of the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450b1)).
(5) Tribal priority allocation. - The term "tribal priority
allocation" means an allocation to a tribal priority account of an
Indian tribe by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to allow that Indian
tribe to establish program priorities and funding levels.
(c) Indian Tribes as Defendants in Tort Disputes.




(1) inserting "(a)" before "The district courts";
(2) inserting "(referred to in this section as an Indian tribe')"
after "Interior"; and
(3) adding at the end the following:
"(b) Subject to the provisions of chapter 171A, the district courts
shall have jurisdiction of civil actions in claims against an Indian
tribe for money damages, accruing on or after the date of enactment
of this subsection for injury or loss of property, personal injury, or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an
Indian tribe (including a tribal organization) under circumstances in
which the Indian tribe, if a private individual or corporation would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the State
where the act or omission occurred.
"(c) Subject to the provisions of chapter 171A, to the extent
necessary to enforce this section, the tribal immunity of the Indian
tribe involved is waived.".
(d) Tort Liability Insurance.
(1) In general. -
(A) Insurance. - Except as provided in paragraph (2), not later
than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall
obtain or provide tort liability insurance or equivalent coverage, on
the most cost-effective basis, for each Indian tribe that receives a
tribal priority allocation.
(B) Coverage. - The insurance obtained under subparagraph
(A) for an Indian tribe shall cover the governing body of the Indian
tribe, each tribal organization, of that Indian tribe and each
contractor or employer of that Indian tribe, within the scope of that
contractor or employer. The coverage shall become effective on the
date on which that coverage is obtained.
(2) Exception. - If the Secretary determines that an Indian tribe
described in paragraph (1) has obtained liability insurance in an
amount and of the type that the Secretary determines to be
appropriate (including meeting the requirement of paragraph (4)) by
the date specified in paragraph (1), the Secretary shall not be
required to provide additional coverage for that Indian tribe.
(3) Tribal immunity may not be asserted to deny claims.
Under the liability insurance obtained under paragraph (1) or that
the Secretary determines to be appropriate under paragraph (2),
tribal immunity may not be asserted by the insurer as a reason for
denying a claim for damages resulting from the tort liability of an
Indian tribe.
(4) Amount of coverage. - In carrying out this subsection, the
Secretary shall ensure that each Indian tribe obtains, or is provided,
in accordance with this subsection, a sufficient amount of insurance
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coverage to cover tort liability of the Indian tribe, under chapter
171A of title 28, United States Code.
(e) Funding of Tort Liability Insurance.
(1) Initial payment of insurance premiums. - For the initial
pa3ment of insurance premiums for insurance obtained or provided
by the Secretary under subsection (d), the Secretary shall take such
action as may be necessary to ensure the payment of premiums by
the Indian tribe, including adjusting the amount of the tribal priority
allocation made to the Indian tribe to cover the cost of the initial
payments.
(2) Subsequent payments.
(A) In general. - After an initial payment under paragraph (1),
and before the Secretary makes a tribal priority allocation for an
Indian tribe, the Secretary shall verify that the Indian tribe -
(i) has insurance coverage that meets the requirements of
subsection (d); and
(ii) has made such payments for premiums of that insurance as
are necessary to provide insurance coverage for the fiscal year for
which the tribal priority allocation is to be made.
(B) Payment required as a condition to receiving tribal priority
allocation. - Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if the
Secretary determines under subparagraph (A) that an Indian tribe
has not made the payments described in subparagraph (A)(ii), the
Secretary shall withhold the tribal priority allocation of that Indian
tribe until such time as those payments are made.
(f) Jurisdiction of District Courts. - Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the district courts shall have jurisdiction over any
action concerning the tort liability of an Indian tribe that is covered
under insurance that meets the requirements of subsection (d), and
a case to recover damages through an insurer that provides coverage
under subsection (d) may be brought without regard to whether
remedies under otherwise applicable tribal law have been exhausted.
(g) Regulations. - To carry out this section, as soon as
practicable after the date of enactment of this section, the Secretary
shall issue regulations that -
(1) provide for the amount of insurance coverage or equivalent
coverage needed to protect an Indian tribe for the liabilities that
may be subject to a claim under chapter 171A of title 28, United
States Code;
(2) establish a schedule of premiums to be assessed against an





(3) establish a means to verify the amount, maintenance, and
funding of insurance of Indian tribes that obtain and maintain
insurance under subsection (d)(3).
(h) Indian Tort Claims Procedure. -
(1) In general. - Part 6 of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by inserting after chapter 171 the following:
"CHAPTER 171A - INDIAN TORT CLAIMS PROCEDURE
"Sec.
"2691. Definitions.




"(1) The term 'employee of an Indian tribe' includes
"(A) an officer or employee of an Indian tribe (including an
officer or employee of a tribal organization); and
"(B) any person acting on behalf of an Indian tribe in an official
capacity, temporarily or permanently, whether with or without
compensation (other than an employee of the Federal Government
or the government of a State or political subdivision thereof who is
acting within the scope of the employment of that individual).
"(2) The term 'Indian tribe' has the meaning given that term in
sections 4(e) of the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450b(e).
"(3) The term 'tribal immunity' means the immunity of an Indian
tribe from -
"(A) jurisdiction of the courts; and
"(B) judicial review of an action of that Indian tribe and other
remedies.
"Sec. 2692. Liability of Indian tribes
"(a) Subject to the limitations under subsection (c), an Indian
tribe (including a tribal organization) shall be liable for the actions
of the employees of that Indian tribe (or tribal organization),
relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent,
as a private individual or corporation under like circumstances, but
shall not be liable for interest before judgment or for punitive
damages.
"(b) Subject to the limitations under subsection (c), in any case
described in subsection (a) in which a death was caused and the law
of the State where the act or omission complained of occurred
provides for punitive damages, the Indian tribe shall, in lieu of
being liable for punitive damages, be liable for actual or
compensatory damages resulting from that death to each person on
behalf of whom action was brought.
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"(c)(1) The liability of an Indian tribe or tribal organization may
not exceed -
"(A) $500,000 for each claim made under this chapter, or
"(B) in any case in which more than 1 claim arises from the
same occurrence for damages for a tortuous act or omission, an
aggregate amount equal to $1,000,000 for those claims.
"(2) If the Secretary of the Interior determines that a limitation
on the amount of liability of an Indian tribe under subparagraph (A)
or (B) is appropriate, the Secretary of the Interior shall submit to
Congress proposed legislation to provide for that increase.
"Sec. 2693. Exceptions; waiver
"(a) The provisions of this chapter and sections 1362(b) shall not
apply to any case relating to a controversy relating to membership
in an Indian tribe.
"(b) With respect to an Indian tribe, to the extent necessary to
carry out this chapter, the tribal immunity of that Indian tribe is
waived.""M
As one can see, Senate Bill 2302 takes a substantially different approach to
tort liability but fails to address several issues raised above concerning Senate
Bill 1691. Senate Bill 2302 would still transfer from the federal government to
tribes the cost of compensating persons now entitled to redress under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Instead of expanding the coverage of the FTCA or simplifying
the process by which a tribe operating under a Self-Governance compact or an
Indian Determination Act contract may bring its activities under the aegis of the
FTCA, Senator Gorton proposes to force the purchase of private insurance that
would be funded solely by tribes.
Section 2(f) of Senate Bill 2302 also makes clear that suits could be brought
"without regard to whether remedies under otherwise applicable tribal law have
been exhausted." This provision would overrule National Farmers Union and
frustrate the efforts of tribal governments to provide alternatives for alternative
systems for compensating tort claimants.
E. Senator Campbell's Tort Liability Proposal in Senate Bill 2097
Senate Bill 2097, introduced by Senator Campbell on May 20, 1998, contains
a more refined approach to the tort liability issue. It states:
SEC. 201. LIABILTY INSURANCE, WAIVER OF DEFENSE.
(a) Tribal Priority Allocation Defined. - The term "tribal
priority allocation" means an allocation to a tribal priority account
of an Indian tribe by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to allow that
Indian tribe to establish program priorities and funding levels.





(1) In general. - Except as provided in paragraph (3), not later
than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary
shall obtain or provide tort liability insurance or equivalent coverage
for each Indian tribe that receives a tribal priority allocation from
amounts made available to the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the
operation of Indian programs.
(2) Cost-effectiveness. - In carrying out paragraph (1), the
Secretary shall -
(A) ensure that the insurance or equivalent coverage is provided
in the most cost-effective manner available; and
(B) for each Indian tribe referred to in paragraph (1), take into
consideration the extent to which the tort liability is covered
(i) by privately secured liability insurance; or
(ii) chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code (commonly
referred to as the "Federal Tort Claims Act") by reason of an
activity of the Indian tribe in which the Indian tribe is acting in the
same capacity as an agency of the United States.
(3) Limitation. - If the Secretary determines that an Indian
tribe, described in paragraph (1), has obtained liability insurance in
an amount and of the type that the Secretary determines to be
appropriate by the date specified in paragraph (1), the Secretary
shall not be required to provide additional coverage for that Indian
tribe.
(c) Requirements. - A policy of insurance or a document for
equivalent coverage under subsection (a)(1) shall -
(1) contain a provision that the insurance carrier shall waive any
right to raise as a defense the sovereign immunity of an Indian tribe
with respect to an action involving tort liability of that Indian tribe,
but only with respect to tort liability claims of an amount and
nature covered under the insurance policy or equivalent coverage
offered by the insurance carrier, and
(2) not waive or otherwise limit the sovereign immunity of the
Indian tribe outside or beyond the coverage or limits of the policy
of insurance or equivalent coverage.
(d) Prohibition. - No waiver of the sovereign immunity of a
Indian tribe under this section shall include a waiver of any
potential liability for -
(1) interest that may be payable before judgment; or
(2) exemplary or punitive damages.
(e) Preference. - In obtaining or providing tort liability
insurance coverage for Indian tribes under this section, the Secretary
shall, to the greatest extent practicable, give preference to coverage
underwritten by Indian-owned economic enterprises, as defined in
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section 3 of the Indian Financing Act of 1974 (25 U.S.C. 1452),
except that for the purposes of this subsection, those enterprises
may include non-profit corporations.
(f) Regulations. - To carry out this title, the Secretary shall
promulgate regulations that -
(1) provide for the amount and nature of claims to be covered
by an insurance policy or equivalent coverage provided to an Indian
tribe under this title; and
(2) establish a schedule of premiums that may be assessed
against any Indian tribe that is provided liability insurance under
this title.
SEC. 202. STUDY AND REPORT TO CONGRESS
(a) In General. -
(1) Study. - In order to minimize and, if possible, eliminate
redundant or duplicative liability insurance coverage and to ensure
that the provision of insurance of equivalent coverage under this
tide is cost-effective, before carrying out the requirements of
sections 201, the Secretary shall conduct a comprehensive survey
of the degree, type, and adequacy of liability insurance coverage of
Indian tribes at the time of the study.
(2) Contents of study. - The study conducted under this
subsection shall include -
(A) an analysis of loss data;
(B) risk assessments;
(C) projected exposure to liability, and related matters; and




(iii) the liability of officials of the Indian tribe;
(iv) law enforcement liability;
(v) workers' compensation; and
(vi) other types of liability contingencies.
(3) Assessment of coverage by categories of risk. - For each
Indian tribe described in sections 201(a)(1), for each category of
risk identified under paragraph (2), the Secretary, in conducting the
study, shall determine whether insurance coverage other than
coverage to be provided under this title or coverage under chapter
171 of title 28, United States Code, applies to that Indian tribe for
that activity.
(b) Report. - Not later than 3 years after the date of enactment
of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit a
report to Congress concerning the implementation of this title, that




determines to be appropriate to improve the provision of insurance
of equivalent coverage to Indian tribes under this title, or otherwise
achieves the goals and objectives of this title.
3 5
A principal difference between Senator Campbell's and Senator Gorton's
approaches to insurance can be seen in sections 201(b)(2) of Senate Bill 2097.
This is the "cost-effectiveness" provision, which requires that the Secretary's
determination of a tribe's tort liability insurance must take into consideration the
extent to which the tort liability is covered by: "Chapter 171 of title 28, U.S.
Code (commonly referred to as the "Federal Tort Claims Act") by reason of an
activity of the Indian tribe in which the Indian tribe is acting in the same
capacity as an agency of the United States."'" This provision, while
potentially narrowing the scope of FTCA coverage presently available under the
Indian Self-Determination Act, at least adverts to the possibility that the FTCA
is a sufficient source of tort liability coverage.
F. The Indian Tribal Tort Claims and Risk Management Act of 1998'
Senator Campbell's tort liability study proposal in Senate Bill 2097 was
enacted substantially verbatim as part of the massive Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Appropriations Act for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1999,
which was signed into law on October 21, 1998." There are two significant
differences between the statute as enacted and Senator Campbell's proposal.
First, only findings 10-13 of Senate Bill 2097, sections 2(a) were enacted, thus
omitting proposed findings concerning inherent tribal sovereignty and the need
for inter-governmental dispute resolution. Most of the omitted findings,
however, related to Senator Campbell's approach to state tax collection issues,
noted above.
The second change from Senate Bill 2097 found in the public law is that
instead of allowing the Secretary of the Interior three years following enactment
to submit a report concerning implementation of legislative recommendations,
sections 704(b) provides:
(b) Report. - Not later than June 1, 1999, and annually
thereafter, the Secretary shall submit a report to Congress that
contains legislative recommendations that the Secretary determine
to -
(1) be appropriate to improve the provision of insurance
coverage to Indian tribes; or
135. S. 2097, 105th Cong. §§ 201-202 (1998).
136. Id § 202(b)(2).
137. Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. A, § 101(e), 112 Stat. 2681-335 (1998).
138. See 25 U.S.C.A. 450f note (West 1999).
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(2) otherwise achieve the purpose of providing relief to persons
who are injured as a result of an official action of a tribal
government.'"
As one might guess, the Secretary of the Interior was unable to complete the
required risk assessment study by June 1, 1999. Indeed the Department's survey
of tribal insurance coverages did not begin until May 1999.
VI. Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Appeals from Rulings Concerning the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
A. The Indian Civil Rights Act and Waivers of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez," ° a case that would be overturned by
Senate Bill 1691, the Supreme Court carefully construed the terms and
legislative history of the Indian Civil Rights Act and concluded that the Act did
not authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief in federal court against
either the tribe or its officers. The Court found an implied waiver of sovereign
immunity particularly inappropriate in the area of tribal membership decisions.
In National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe,4' the Court
clarified that federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to hear
claims that a tribe has exceeded its authority, provided that tribal court remedies
are first exhausted.
These cases have had two" effects: (1) caselaw has developed within tribal
courts to enforce the Indian Civil Rights Act; and (2) a broad right of federal
court review is recognized concerning tribal court decisions challenged by
nonmembers of the tribe who assert tribal authority is limited by a provision of
federal law, including the Indian Civil Rights Act."
Tribal courts now generally apply the Indian Civil Rights Act
notwithstanding sovereign immunity claims. Developments in the Hoopa Valley
Tribal Court in California illustrate that meritorious claims are being handled
justly and on their merits.
The Hoopa Tribal Court has long recognized the doctrine of Ex parte
Young'", that sovereign immunity does not give officials the power to violate
or ignore federal or other applicable law. For example, Marshall v.
Colegrove,"4 involved the claim that the tribal chairman enjoyed unauthorized
salary increases and received reimbursement for unauthorized travel. The court
139. hi.
140. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
141. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
142. See Burlington Northern Ry. Co. v. Red Wolf, 106 F.3d 868 (9th Cir.), vacated, 118 S.
Ct. 37 (1997), appeal after remand, 196 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion amended on denial
reh'g, Nos. 98-35502, 98-35539, 98-35541, 1999 WL 1293020 (9th Cir. 1999).
143. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).




noted the doctrine of sovereign immunity but held that "the immunity is lost
when the: tribal official is acting outside the course and scope of his official
capacity."
Gray v. Hoopa Valley Tribal Election Board,"4 involved an election appeal.
The court construed Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,"4 as affirming tribal
court exclusive jurisdiction to construe the tribal constitution and to enforce the
Indian Civil Rights Act "where tribal agencies or officers act outside the scope
of their authority." The court rejected defendant's claim of sovereign immunity
and the argument that the tribal constitution made decisions of the tribal election
board umneviewable.
Sovereign immunity is also not a bar to recovery of "back pay" or damages
from the tribe and its departments if they engage in unlawful employment
practices.' 4 It is thus clear under Hoopa tribal law that sovereign immunity
will not prevent the enforcement of rights guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights
Act nor will it shield tribal officials who act outside of their lawful authority
under tribal or federal law. Hoopa tribal law may well be typical of the law
applied in Indian tribal courts and points away from directing all such cases to
federal district court.
As noted above, the Supreme Court has ruled that after a party exhausts
tribal court remedies, federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
to determine whether a tribe has been divested of authority over the matter in
issue. Because nonmembers generally argue that a tribal court has no
jurisdiction over them, the only parties who may have difficulty establishing
federal question jurisdiction are tribal members themselves.' For that reason,
the Hoopa Valley Tribal Council and the Saginaw Chippewa Tribal Council
have endorsed the following provision:
Any case in the highest court of an Indian tribe may be reviewed
at the discretion of the Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the
Indian tribal court is located, by writ of certiorari granted upon the
petiltion of any party to the case after rendition of final judgment,
where a claim or defense arises under the Constitution, laws or
treaties of the United States; provided, however, that applicable
tribal custom or tradition shall be given due consideration. "
145. No. C-97-036 (Hoopa Valley Tr. Ct. Mar. 25, 1997).
146. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
147. See Ames v. Hoopa Valley Tribal Council, 21 Indian L. Rep. 6039 (Hoopa Ct. App.
1991); Hoopa Valley Indian Hous. Auth. v. Gerstner, 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6002 (Hoopa Ct. App.
1993); Tribal Educ. Dept v. Nixon, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6005 (N.W. Regional Tribal Sup. Ct. for
Hoopa Valley Tribal Ct. App. 1997).
148. See National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 852 (1985).
149. Resolution of the Hoopa Valley Tribe, No. 98-41 (Apr. 17, 1998); Resolution of the
Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan.
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Tribal courts have been vigilant in enforcing the Indian Civil Rights Act to
protect both members and nonmembers, and have little to fear from the fact that
federal court reviews sometimes occur. However, it is important that federal
courts avoid intruding into areas governed by tribal custom and tradition or the
tribal self-definition process that occurs in tribal enrollment.
B. Senator Gorton's Proposed Overruling of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
in Senate Bill 1691 and His Approach to Appeals from Tribal Court ICRA
Decisions in Senate Bill 2298
Section 7 of Senate Bill 1691 would have given federal district courts broad
jurisdiction to hear cases asserting that the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 had
been violated. This provision, retained in Senator Gorton's other proposed
legislation, is not justified by present law.
Senate Bill 2298 was introduced by Senator Gorton on July 14, 1998, as the
so-called Indian Civil Rights Enforcement Act. This bill provides as follows:
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds that -
(1) title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (25 U.S.C. 1301 et
seq.) (commonly known as the "Indian Civil Rights Act") was
enacted to protect the civil rights of individuals who interact with
tribal governments and other tribal organizations;
(2) individuals who interact with tribal governments and other
tribal organizations continue to suffer civil rights abuses, including
unfair dismissals from employment with a tribal government or
other tribal organization, election irregularities, and improper use of
law enforcement authority;
(3) a 1991 report of the United States Commission on Civil
Rights found that the enforcement of rights guaranteed by the Act
commonly known as the "Indian Civil Rights Act" continued to be
impeded by reluctance among Indian tribes to waive tribal
immunity;
(4) Congress has considered the impediments to enforcing the
Act commonly known as the 'Indian Civil Rights Act" for a period
preceding the date of enactment of this Act of more than 10 years;
(5) under article II of the Constitution of the United States,
individuals have the opportunity to seek action in a district court of
the United States after exhausting remedies in tribal courts for
enforcement of the Act commonly known as the "Indian Civil
Rights Act"; and
(6) to provide for the opportunity referred to in paragraph (5),






(1) Indian tribe. - The term "Indian tribe" means any Indian
tribe or band with a governing body duly recognized by the
Secretary of the Interior.
(2) Tribal government. - The term "tribal government" means
a governing body of an Indian tribe referred to in paragraph (1).
(3) Tribal immunity. - The term "tribal immunity" means the
immunity of an Indian tribe from jurisdiction of the courts, judicial
review of an action of that Indian tribe, and other remedies.
(4) Tribal organization. - The term "tribal organization" has the
meaning given that term in sections 4(1) of the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450b(1)).
SEC. 4. INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT ENFORCEMENT.
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (commonly known as the
"Indian Civil Rights Act") (25 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.) is amended by
adding at the end the following:
"SEC. 204. ENFORCEMENT.
"(a) In General. - The district courts of the United States shall
have jurisdiction in any civil rights action alleging a failure to
comply with rights secured by the requirements of this title.
"(b) Compliance. - Upon exhaustion of remedies in a tribal
court of appropriate jurisdiction (if any) to seek compliance with
rights secured under this title as are timely and reasonable, an
aggrieved individual may bring an action against an Indian tribe
(including a tribal organization (as that term is defined in section
40) of that Act (25 U.S.C. 450b(!)) or official of that Indian tribe))
in a district court of the United States, or the Attorney General of
the United States may bring such an action against an Indian tribe
for -
"(1) a declaratory judgment; or
"(2) equitable relief (including injunctive relief) against an Indian
tribe, to the extent necessary to enforce the rights secured under this
title.
"(c) Treatment of Findings of Tribal Court. -
"(1) In general. - In a civil action brought under subsection (b),
the district court shall adopt any findings of fact made by the tribal
court involved (if any) with respect to the action, unless the district
court determines that -
"(A) the tribal court did not operate independently from the
legislative or executive authority of the Indian tribe involved;
"(B) the tribal court was not authorized to determine matters of
law and fact, or the tribal court did not fully determine those
matters;
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
"(C) the tribal court permitted a person or entity subject to this
title to assert a defense of immunity in a declaratory action or an
action to seek equitable relief;
"(D) the tribal court failed to resolve the merits of the factual
dispute involved;
"(E) the tribal court employed a factfinding procedure that was
not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
"(F) the tribal court did not adequately develop facts that are
material to the case;
"(G) the tribal court failed to provide a full, fair, and adequate
himring; or
"(H) the factual determinations of the tribal court are not fairly
supported by the record.
"(2) De novo review. - In any action described in paragraph
(1), if the court finds that a condition described in subparagraph
(k), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), or (H) of that paragraph applies,
the district court shall conduct a de novo review of the allegations
contained in the complaint.
"(d) Waiver of Tribal Immunity. - To the extent necessary to
enforce this title, the tribal immunity (as that term is defined in
section 3 of the Indian Civil Rights Enforcement Act) of an Indian
tribe subject to an action under subsection (b) is waived."'
Unlike Senator Gorton's other bills, Senate Bill 2298 expressly provides for
exhaustion of remedies in tribal court. Nevertheless, there are crucial differences
between the bill and the federal court review provision endorsed by some tribes.
Senate *Bill 2298 provides for district court jurisdiction.' The tribal proposal
provides for discretionary review by the federal court of appeals by writ
certiorari. In addition, the tribal provision provides for consideration of an
"applicable tribal custom or tradition. '"' There is no counterpart in Senate Bill
2298.
VII. Sovereign Immunity and Federal Environmental Laws
A. Applfcation of Federal Environmental Statutes to Indian Tribes
In environmental statutes such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of :1976 (part of the Solid Waste Disposal Act), Congress has expressly
waived tribal sovereign immunity. Blue Legs v. Bureau of Indian Affairs,"
150. S. 2298, 105th Cong. §§ 2-4 (1998).
151. S. 2298, 105th Cong. § 204(a) (1998).
152. Resolution of the Hoopa Valley Tribe, No. 98-41 (Apr. 17, 1998).
153. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k 1994).




found a waiver of sovereign immunity in civil suits because tribes are
specifically included in the statutory definition of municipality.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)"55 does not
expressly refer to Indian tribes. However, because NEPA applies to federal
agencies that often have permitting or approval authority for land use on
reservations, NEPA applies indirectly." More recent environmental statutes,
such as the Clean Water Act,I" the Clean Air Act," and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)'" have
specific provisions concerning Indian tribes.
B. Senator Gorton's Current Proposal Concerning Application of Federal
Environmental Laws in Senate Bill 2301
Congress' generally careful treatment of Indian tribes in environmental acts
would be radically restructured by Senator Gorton's Senate Bill 2301, introduced
July 14, 1998, the so-called Tribal Environmental Accountability Act. Senator
Gorton's proposed language provides:
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds that -
(1) Federal environmental laws are in effect for the benefit of the
citizens of the United States, including members of Indian tribes;
(2) certain Federal environmental laws allow citizens to initiate
an action to provide for enforcement, including, in some cases,
injunctions to prevent a proposed activity from occurring until such
time as certain procedural and substantive requirements are met;
and
(3) the assertion of tribal immunity used to shield an Indian tribe
from remedies necessary to achieve compliance with Federal
environmental laws impedes the application of those laws for the
purpose specified in paragraph (1).
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Federal environmental law. - The term "Federal
environmental law" means any Federal law affecting the
environment, fish and wildlife conservation, or the use of land or
water.
(2) Indian tribe. - The term "Indian tribe" has the meaning
given that term in section 4(e) of the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450b(e)).
155. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1994).
156. E.g., Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972).
157. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
158. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
159. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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(3) Tribal immunity. - The term "tribai immunity" means the
immunity of an Indian tribe from jurisdiction of the courts, judicial
review of an action of that Indian tribe, and other remedies.
(4) Tribal organization. - The term "tribal organization" has the
meaning given that term in section 40) of the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450b(I)).
SEC. 4. APPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969.
(a) In General. - An Indian tribe (including a tribal
organization) shall be subject to any requirements that are
applicable to any other governmental entity for any action that is
subject to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42
U.S.C. 4331 et seq.).
(b) Waiver of Tribal Immunity. - To the extent necessary to
enforce this section, the tribal immunity of an Indian tribe is
waived.
SEC. 5. CERTAIN CIVIL ACTIONS.
(a) In General. - A person or entity may commence a civil
action against an Indian tribe under any provision of any Federal
environmental law that authorizes a civil action by that person or
entity against that Indian tribe.
(b) Waiver of Tribal Immunity. - With respect to a civil action
commenced under subsection (a) -
(1) the tribal immunity of the Indian tribe involved is waived;
and
(2) that Indian tribe may not assert tribal immunity as a defense.
SEC. 6. APPLICABILITY.
(a) National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. - Section 4
applies to any action described in section 4(a) with respect to any
project or activity of an Indian tribe that has not been completed as
of the date of enactment of this Act.
(b) Civil Actions. - Section 5 applies to any civil action
described in that section commenced on or after the date of
enactment of this Act."
The fundamental confusion of Senate Bill 2301 is found in section 4 which
would make a tribe "subject to any requirements that are applicable to any other
governmental entity for any action that is subject to" NEPA."6 Perhaps the
intent of that section is to deem tribes to be federal agencies within the meaning
of NEPA. Because NEPA is not designed for applicability outside of the federal
government, it is unclear that the statute would function in a rational way. An
160. S. 2301, 105th Cong. §§ 2-6 (1998).




additional consequence of this provision would be to override or duplicate tribal
environmental review processes that are currently in place.
The reach of section 5 of Senate Bill 2301 is also unclear. Section 5(a)
authorizes civil actions against tribes "under any provision of any federal
environmental law that authorizes a civil action by that person or entity against
that Indian tribe."" On its face, this provision appears to restate the waiver
of tribal sovereign immunity that exists in certain federal environmental laws.
It might be construed to create such a waiver in other federal environmental
laws which cannot currently provide for one.
Senate Bill 2301 is a poorly drafted bill that takes no notice of the complex
law and facts regarding land, water and air use on Indian reservations. Instead
of being entitled the Tribal Environmental Accountability Act, it is better read
simply as the "Anti-Muckleshoot Amphitheater Act."
VIII. Conclusion
Sovereign immunity is misunderstood, less far reaching than often believed,
and greatly limited throughout the twentieth century by the doctrine of Exparte
Young. Maintaining a functioning government requires protecting the public
treasury and domain. Yet people demand remedies for government-caused
injuries. These are provided by all levels of government, including tribes,
through thoughtful administrative or judicial claims procedures and dispute
resolution sections in contracts.
Senator Gorton's spate of bills in the 105th Congress sought to capitalize on
anti-Indian sentiment and root out not only extreme uses of sovereign immunity,
but also the protections that make government itself possible to tribes. The
Senator's efforts show an unscrupulous willingness to take political advantage
where possible.
Sovereign immunity has become a lightning rod for political and economic
forces that oppose the continued existence of American Indian tribes.
Nevertheless the United States Supreme Court has continued to uphold the
sovereign immunity of governmental entities - tribal, state, and federal. The
legislative attacks of Sen. Slade Gorton and others during the 105th Congress
failed. But the struggle over the sovereign's purse is not over.
162. i § 5(a).
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